Una recensione di "Antonin Scalia" di Giuseppe Portonera
G. Portonera, Antonin Scalia, Torino, IBL Libri, 2022
Seven years after the sudden death of Antonin Scalia in February 2016 at age 79, his name still resonates in American public discourse. Through his academic works, public remarks, and opinions in his nearly 30 years as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he championed the twin doctrines of “originalism” and “textualism.” Originalism posits that the language of the United States Constitution has a fixed meaning and judges must interpret its words based on the public meaning they carried at the time of writing. Textualism restricts judicial interpretation of statutes and administrative regulations to the ordinary meaning of the specific words used, dispensing with extraneous factors not found in the text itself, such as legislative intent or the societal purposes the legislation seeks to serve. This formulistic approach, designed to combat so-called judicial law-making, requires the judge, as Scalia explained, to apply the law as it is and not as he or she would wish it to be.
In his new intellectual biography of Scalia, Antonin Scalia (IBL Libri July 2022), Giuseppe Portonera, a Forlin Fellow at the Bruno Leoni Institute in Milan, explores Scalia’s thought and legacy and places them in an international context. Portonera writes that his book is intended as an introduction for Italian readers to Scalia’s life, thought, and influence, and also an attempt to identify particular aspects of Scalia’s philosophy that might be useful in Italian jurisprudence. To my mind, however as a former American trial court judge and appellate justice in California, Portonera’s singular achievement is to present Scalia’s legacy and legal thought dispassionately and with an even hand, not shying away from the occasional contradictions, rhetorical excesses, and controversies, while being faithful to the intellectual rigor of Scalia’s philosophy. Moreover, Portonera’s frequent presentation of Scalia’s own words in impeccable Italian translation is a feat in itself. My only regret is that the book is not available in English translation (at least not currently) and thus cannot be shared with a general American readership, who would undoubtedly benefit from Portonera’s insights and international perspective.
As Portonera observes, Scalia did not invent textualism and originalism. The idea that the meaning of a law is fixed when it is adopted, and that such meaning must be changed not by judicial fiat but only by legislative means, has deep roots in American jurisprudence as far back as the first Chief Justice of the United States, John Marshall, who served from 1801 to 1835, and who was also the author of the seminal decision, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1807), that established the power of judicial review, that is, the power of the judiciary to determine the constitutionality of actions by the other two branches of the American government (executive and legislative). But this originalist jurisprudential tradition was eclipsed over the years through various doctrinal approaches (Portonera deftly charts the course of the transition), leading to a prevailing jurisprudence, best exemplified by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953-1969), in which the Constitution was viewed as a so-called “living document” whose meaning evolved over time and could be interpreted by judges to fit changing circumstances.
Scalia’s great achievement is that almost singlehandedly, through his advocacy for originalism and textualism, he fundamentally changed the course of interpretive jurisprudence in the United States. His ideas have come to define (his critics would say hold hostage) the debate about the proper role of judges in fulfilling their quintessential task in American jurisprudence: discerning the meaning of the United States Constitution and legislative enactments.
At first blush, one might question whether a foreign scholar can fully capture the arc of Scalia’s uniquely American career and influence. Portonera proves that assumption wrong. As he writes in his introduction, in words that ring true to an American ear, Scalia’s career was one “che, con un tocco di colore ma non di esagerazione, può dirsi da «star»: Scalia è stato apprezzato o disprezzato, addirittura amato o odiato, ma non ha mai lasciato freddi gli animi, esattamente come si conviene a una forza in grado di incidere sui termini del discorso. All’inizio della sua carriera, e per molti anni a seguire, la sua era considerata una voce isolata ed eccentrica. Alla fine di essa, non c’era collega alla Corte suprema, politico, avvocato, professore o studente universitario che non soltanto avesse preso sul serio quella voce, ma che non avesse riconosciuto che essa è stata la più influente degli ultimi decenni.”
In monogram form, Portonera has divided the book into sections, the first two of which (after the introduction) provide a brief biography of Scalia’s life and discuss the historical and cultural context in which Scalia and his judicial philosophy were formed. The core of the book, however, and its main contribution to the scholarship, lie in the succeeding sections, which are dedicated to Scalia’s works and ideas, and which explore originalism and textualism as conceived and practiced by Scalia. Portonera also documents the strands of Scalia’s philosophy that continue to dominate judicial debate in the United States today and the role Scalia’s thought might play in Italian jurisprudence.
In the book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Reading Texts, co-authored with linguist Bryan Garner, Scalia wrote that his interpretative approach was (as faithfully translated by Portonera) “quello della «lettura onesta» (fair reading): determinare l’applicazione del testo normativo di riferimento ai fatti di causa sulla base di come un lettore ragionevole, pienamente versato nell’uso della lingua, avrebbe compreso il testo stesso al momento in cui è stato adottato. L’operazione richiede competenza nella conoscenza della lingua, un giudizio ragionato, l’esclusione delle proprie preferenze personali rispetto al risultato e, nel caso dei testi più antichi, una ricerca del significato che le parole avevano in quel preciso momento storico».
The philosophical foundation for Scalia’s approach lies in major part in an appreciation of the structure of the system of government created by the American Constitution, especially the concept of separation of powers. As Portonera succinctly describes it: “L’originalismo, è stato detto, oltre a essere un metodo interpretativo è una teoria sulla genesi dell’obbligazione politica, fondata su due assiomi: primo: in un sistema democratico imperniato sulla separazione dei poteri, l’autorità di legiferare spetta ai rappresentanti investiti della legittimazione popolare; secondo: gli individui osservano le regole perché ne riconoscono la legittimità, e ne riconoscono la legittimità perché hanno avuto parte, diretta o indiretta, nella loro formazione[78]. I giudici devono quindi applicare lealmente le leggi, lasciando che sia l’elettorato a premere per una loro modifica là dove esse dovessero risultare inadeguate. Si tratta, in altre parole, di mantenere viva la ripartizione di poteri e responsabilità tra elettori, eletti e magistrati, senza accedere a un modello che potrebbe invece definirsi «collaborativo», ossia uno in cui, semplificando, l’istituzione giudiziaria sia parte attiva della promozione del cambiamento sociale.”
Portonera observes, however, that this rationale is more persuasive in the case of originalism than of textualism. Whereas changing a judicial declaration of the meaning of a constitutional provision requires the cumbersome (and in modern times, near impossible) task of amending the Constitution, changing a judicial interpretation of a legislative enactment requires only that the legislature reaffirm the original intended meaning by majority vote.
Moreover, as Portonera recognizes, Scalia’s formalistic approach can be excessively rigid. Portonera writes: “Nel complesso, può osservarsi che la soluzione interpretativa promossa da Scalia è eccessivamente rigorosa e non in linea con la stessa tradizione giuridica statunitense[53]. Di conseguenza, può suggerirsi la possibilità di una apertura, proprio da una prospettiva testualista che potrebbe dirsi «moderata», verso un’interpretazione che muova oltre il testo. Nel caso dell’interpretazione analogica, infatti, non si vede perché l’interprete, anche solo facendo riferimento all’intenzione «obiettificata» nel testo di legge, e che in questo modo scomponga la norma fra fattispecie e regola di disciplina, non possa applicare quest’ultima a casi analoghi. Vero è, come Scalia osserva, che è una fallacia ritenere che una legge persegua il proprio scopo a ogni costo, sicché ogni lacuna debba essere colmata in nome dello spirito della norma[54]: tuttavia, l’interpretazione analogica conosce limiti che, se rispettati, evitano che essa si trasformi in un veicolo di arbitrario creazionismo giudiziario[55]. Peraltro, ammettere in astratto la possibilità di ricorrere all’analogia ha il pregio di rendere trasparente l’argomentare del giudice, allo stesso tempo consentendone una adeguata razionalizzazione.”
Further, Portonera recognizes that “Il rigore della soluzione interpretativa promossa da Scalia, con la quasi totale obliterazione dello spazio dell’intenzione del legislatore, delinea quindi un testualismo che può dirsi assoluto o monistico. Quest’ultimo, però, pare non essere unanimemente condiviso tra i giuristi statunitensi che più direttamente alla sua lezione si richiamano: difatti, in linea con il quadro attuale della giurisprudenza d’oltre-oceano, a essere maggioritaria è una impostazione che si attiene anzitutto e principalmente al dato letterale e che, ove questo risulti ambiguo, si richiama all’intenzione del legislatore, sempre e soltanto allo scopo di risolvere l’ambiguità. Benché questo metodo non corrisponda interamente a quello difeso da Scalia, è indubbio che esso sia grandemente tributario proprio di quest’ultimo, che ha avuto il merito di difendere, con fare «militante», la centralità che le parole della legge rivestono nell’economia dell’attività esegetica.”
Insights such as these (and there are many more) keep Portonera’s treatment of Scalia’s philosophy fresh and nuanced, even to one familiar with his work, and demonstrate the author’s full grasp of the intellectual power but also the intellectual limits of Scalia’s approach to textual interpretation. I confess that, as a former American appellate jurist (in line with Portonera’s description of the majority approach), I have often struggled with the notion that researching the historical record to discern the publicly understood meaning of an ambiguous legal text at the time it was written is any more objective, reliable or democratic in practice than resort to broader evidentiary sources, such as the drafters’ intent or consideration of the purpose of the provision. Moreover, the originalist’s interpretation of ambiguous text may arise less from an objective determination of a fixed historical meaning than from the interpretive limits created by the judge’s own subjective choice of which parts of the historical record to consult. Further, historic records are disparate, rarely clear, and must themselves must be interpreted. Thus, originalism might be seen as no more a reliable indicator of historical public meaning than methods of objective interpretation that rely on a broader body of evidence of meaning.
This debate is no more evident than in what Portonera describes as the major success of Scalia’s career, his 5-4 majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In Heller, Scalia declared that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an “individual” right to bear arms for self-defense. The case involved a challenge to the extremely restrictive gun control regulations in place in the District of Colombia on the ground that they violated the Second Amendment, which reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
As Portonera states, in Heller the key question was how to interpret the connection between the prefatory clause (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) and the operative clause (the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”). A focus on the prefatory clause suggests the right to bear arms is a collective right, that is, a right that exists in a militia or state organized military organization. A focus on the operative clause suggests an individual or private right to bear arms which is not to be infringed.
In Heller, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion adopted the former interpretation. According to Scalia, the phrase bear arms historically “unequivocally” carried a military meaning “only when followed by the preposition ‘against.’” The Second Amendment does not use the word against. Therefore, Scalia reasoned, the phrase bear arms, by itself, referred to an individual right. Scalia recognized that the government can legitimately balance against the public interest the exercise of this private right to bear arms for self-defense, but cannot bar the exercise of that right entirely.
The Heller opinion was a major victory for Scalia in two senses, writes Portonera. “Scalia è riuscito a «resuscitare» il significato originario dell’enunciato costituzionale, restituendolo alla dimensione di diritto vigente, ma anche … il metodo originalista è stato impiegato nella principale dissenting opinion, redatta da Justice Stevens, sia pure per sostenere l’opposta conclusione a favore della natura collettiva del diritto di possedere e portare armi. È opportuno sottolineare, però, come Stevens abbia fatto ampio uso non del cosiddetto original pubblic meaning, bensì dell’original intent originalism, facendo più volte riferimento alle intenzioni soggettive dei singoli Padri costituenti.”
To this I would add only that, to another judicial mind, Scalia’s victory in Heller over Stevens did not necessarily rest on a more rigorous or accurate analysis of the historic public meaning of the amendment when written, but rather on differing doctrinal choices about what sources to consult. Thus, Heller is perhaps the primary example of the ascension of Scalia’s philosophy to the mainstream during his lifetime, a tribute to his stamina, brilliance, and persuasive powers. But it is also an example of how, despite its virtue of requiring the judge to set aside personal preferences and document in concrete evidence his or her interpretation of the words used, Scalia’s approach does not necessarily and inexorably lead to a more historically accurate interpretation of the Constitution than the broader approach of Stevens that looked in part at objective evidence of the drafters’ intent.
In the final section of his book, Portonera captures the essence of Scalia’s American legacy and seeks to identify which aspects of his philosophy might find a place in Italian jurisprudence. He observes that Scalia has not fully vanquished adherents to other interpretive philosophies; his doctrines are still the target of critics, including one of his former clerks, Adrian Vermeule, now a professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School, who advances, as described by Portonera, “il cosiddetto Common Good Constitutionalism, il quale apertamente si richiama alla tradizione giuridica classica, nonché – proprio al contrario di quanto costantemente affermato da Scalia – al diritto naturale, e intende interpretare la Costituzione e le leggi in modo da promuovere il «bene comune».
Yet Scalia’s influence remains pervasive, as reflected by the fact that his philosophy remains the subject of discussion, pro and con. Portonera identifies three main threads of Scalia’s influence in the United States. The first is a general acknowledgement in the judicial community of the structural, political foundation of originalism and textualism. Portonera writes that “a fronte di una degenerazione dell’attività giudiziale in una riedizione del processo legislativo, l’idea – semplice, e forse proprio per questo efficace – che i giudici devono applicare la legge per quel che è, non per quello che vorrebbero che fosse, ha saputo fare breccia nel cuore di intere generazioni di giuristi.”
The second main current of Scalia’s American legacy is that he restored a neutral, objective rigor to the interpretive task, “Un metodo,” Portonera writes, “che persegua l’aspirazione alla neutralità decisionale attraverso l’impiego di strumenti obiettivi produce risultati che sono comunicabili nel discorso scientifico e che possono essere pertanto valutati proprio in base alla loro coerenza o meno con le premesse metodologiche”.
Third, Portonera writes that although Scalia’s vision of originalism built on the tradition established by other jurists before him, “È stato Scalia a prendere sulle proprie spalle quella tradizione e a darle vita nuova. La sua lunga e paziente stagione di raccolta ha dato i suoi frutti migliori tra le più giovani generazioni di giuristi, che hanno letto e studiato le sue opinions durante gli anni universitari, trovandovi l’antidoto a un certo conformismo intellettuale che spesso imperversa negli ambienti accademici.”
In terms of aspects of Scalia’s philosophy that might be useful for Italian jurists, Portonera identifies three: “il peso che originalismo e testualismo possono avere nell’argomentazione costituzionale e nell’interpretazione di merito o di legittimità; la riflessione sul ruolo del giudice nella società liberal-democratica; il rilievo che la struttura costituzionale, anzitutto la separazione dei poteri, ha nella garanzia dei diritti individuali.”
I leave it to the experts on Italian jurisprudence, such as Portonera, to sort out how Scalia’s legacy might be of benefit to Italian judges. It only remains for me, as a former American judge, to say that Portonera has written, a truly remarkable work of scholarship and insight that deserves a prime place in the Scalia canon, in Italy and beyond.